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To commence the 30 day statutory
time period for appeals as of right
(CPLR 5513(a]), you are advised to
serve a copy of this order, with
notice of entry, upon all parties

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS

--------------------------------~--- ------------------------x

In the Matter of the Application of
JOHN E. RUZAS,

DECISION & ORDER

Petitioner,
Index No. 1456/2016
-against Sequence Nos. 3 & 4
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
TINA M. STANFORD, Chairperson,
Respondent.

For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

-----------------------------------------------------------){
GROSSMAN, J.S.C.

The following papers, numbered 1 to 14, were considered in connection with Petitioner's
Notice of Motion, dated July 26, 2017, seeking an Order, inter alia, holding Respondent in contempt,
and Petitioner's Notice of Motion, dated August 25, 2017, seeking an Order, directing Respondent
to disclose the full and complete parole file of Petitioner considered by Respondent in connection
with his court-ordered de novo hearing held on April I 8, 2017. In addition, on October 17, 2017,

the Court heard a lengthy oral argument on the issues raised.
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On July 14, 1975, Petitioner John E. Ruzas was convicted of two counts of Murder in the
Second Degree (depraved indifference and felony murder), one count of Robbery in the First
Degree, and two counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, for the
October 24, 1974 fatal shooting of a New York State Trooper after fleeing from an armed
robbery he committed with three accomplices. 1 This incident occurred while Petitioner was on
parole for a 1969 third-degree robbery conviction.
The court sentenced Petitioner, as a second felony offender, to an indeterminate term of
imprisonment of twenty-five years to life for each murder conviction; twelve and one-half to
twenty-five years' imprisonment for the robbery conviction; and seven and one-half to fifteen
years' imprisonment for each of the criminal possession of a weapon convictions. The court
ordered the two murder and one weapons possession convictions to run concurrently. The court
ordered the robbery and remaining weapons possession convictions to run concurrently. The
court then ordered each set of concurrent sentences to run consecutively to each other. 2 At the
time, Petitioner was 32 years old.

1

According to this Court's January 31, 2017 Decis'ion and Order, Petitioner's sentence
also encompassed a second-degree conspiracy plea from April 21 , 1976, for which he was
sentenced an indeterminate term of two to four years imprisonment to run concurrently with the
other sentences (Notice of Motion, Exh. I n.2).
2

ln this Court's prior decision, the Court noted that the Parole Board minutes read that
although the sentencing court ordered the two concurrent terms to run consecutively, Petitioner's
"aggregated term by law is 25 to life," in accordance with the statute that addresses the merging
of sentences (Notice of Motion, Exh. 1 n. 3).
2
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On November 10, 2015, Petitioner appeared before the parole board for the 11 •h time, but
was denied parole:
Denied 24 months, November 2017.
After a review of the record, interview, consideration of all statutorily required
factors and deliberation, this panel has determined that if released at this time
there is a reasonable probability that you would not live and remain at liberty
without again violating the law and your release would be incompatible with the
welfare of society and would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime as to
undermine respect for the law.
This decision is based on the following factors:
Your instant offenses are Murder 2nd degree two counts, Robbery !51 degree,
Criminal Possession of a Weapon 2nd degree three counts, and Conspiracy 2nd
degree in which you acted in concert with others and robbed a jewelry store in
Syracuse. During your return to New York City, you were stopped by a New
York State Trooper. You shot him causing his death. You stole the car and fled
and you committed these offenses while under parole supervision.
Your record dates back to a 1957 JD, includes several felonies, a juvenile history,
prior violence, prior prison, and failure at prior community supervision.
Due consideration was given your sentencing minutes, COMP AS Risk
Assessment, rehabilitative efforts, case plan, risks, needs, parole plan, letters of
support, age, medical status, disciplinary record, significant opposition to your
release, remorse, insight, as well as all other factors required by law.
Your violence and senseless actions were a horrific escalation of your criminal
lifestyle, needlessly causing the death of a brave New York State Trooper,
Emerson Dillon, and forever harming his family. Your version of events indicate
you initiating the gun battle.
The instant offense is an escalation of your violent criminal history.
You clearly failed to benefit from prior efforts at leniency and rehabilitation.
Parole is denied.
Petitioner appealed this determination-on the grounds that: (a) the Board focused
exclusively on the instant offense and a juvenile delinquent adjudication rendered 58 years ago;
3
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(b) relied upon erroneous information; (c) relied on significant opposition; (d) failed to consider
the most recent case plan; and (e) rendered a detailed decision in conclusory tenns. However, the
Appeals Unit affirmed the Board's decision.
Then, on January 31, 2017, this Court found that Respondent's decision to deny parole to
Petitioner was arbitrary and capricious, stating (Notice of Motion, Exh. 1 at 4):

Despite the existent of, inter alia, Petitioner's low risk of recidivism, low history
of violence, low risk of substance abuse, his family support, his remorse, his ·
planned employment upon release, his age and his recent stroke, the Board
summarily denied his application without any explanation other than by reiterating
the laundry list of statutory factors. The minimal attention, barely lip service,
given to these factors and to the COMPAS Assessment cannot be justified given
the amount of time already served.
The Court noted that this case involved the death of a state trooper, and refused to
minimize that fact, but noted that the record was devoid of aggravating circumstances beyond
that crime itself to justify the denial of parole for the 1 ith time (Notice of Motion, Exh. l at 5).
Finally, the Court noted that the Board improperly relied on community opposition from parties
not authorized by Executive Law §§259-i(2)(c)(A)(v) & (vii), and explicitly stated "it was error
for Respondent to consider letters opposing parole from any person or any organization that did
not fall under" the definition in Executive Law§§ 259-i(2)(c)(A) (Notice of Motion, Exh. 1 at 56) (emphasis added). 3

The Court ordered that Respondent hold a.® novo hearing on the matter of Petitioner's
release within 60 days of the date of that Decision and Order - to wit, by March 30, 2017 - and
to focus on "Petitioner's rehabi1itative efforts, rather than solely on the events of 41 years ago"
3

The Court notes that it mistyped the actual sub-section of the statute it was citing, but it
is clear from the statutory language quoted in the body of this Court's Decision and Order that it
was citing Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), not §259-i(c)(A) (emphasis added).
4
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(Notice of Motion, Exh. 1). In addition, as stated above, the Court held "'it was error to consider
letters opposing parole from any person" who did not fall under the provisions of Executive Law
§§259-i(2)(c)(A).
Today, having served over 42 years in prison, Petitioner is approaching his 75th birthday.
He suffered a stroke in prison in 2014 and walks with a cane. He is hard of hearing and requires
a hearing aid. He was transported to the oral argument in a wheelchair and had to be moved
closer to the arguments in order to hear the attorneys and the undersigned during the 90-minute
hearing.

On April 18, 2017 - 19 days after the court-ordered deadline to hold the new hearing Petitioner appeared before Respondent for his de novo hearing (Notice of Motion, Exh. 3). A

review of those hearing minutes reveal that the parole board, again, had no intention of seriously
considering Petitioner for parole and had no intention of complying with this Court's Order. The
interview spans 35 pages and focuses almost entirely on the underlying crime, except for two

questions about Petitioner's COMPAS Risk Assessment results and eleven questions about his
behavior in prison and his plans to live with his wife upon release (Notice of Motion, Exh. 3 at
30-33). Respondent concluded the hearing and denied Petitioner parole (Notice of Motion, Exhs.
3-4):

Denied 24 Months, next appearance November 2017.
After a review of the record, interview, and deliberation the panel has determined
that if released at this time, there is a reasonable probability that you would not
live and remain at liberty without again violating the law, and that your release
would be incompatible with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the
serious nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the 1aw. Parole is denied.
Required statutory factors have been considered, together with your institutional
adjustment including discipline and program participation, your risk and needs
5
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assessment, your release plans, and your needs for successful re-ently into the
community. More compelling, however, is that the instant offense marks your
second New York State incarceration resulted from two murder second A 1
convictions, criminal possession of a weapon second C two counts, robbery 1 B,
and criminal possession of a weapon second C and conspiracy second B where
you in concert robbed a jewelry store in Syracuse, New York and left Syracuse in
a vehicle headed towards New York City. En route you were stopped by a State
Trooper, a scuffle ensued between you and the trooper, at which time you shot and
killed the trooper. You were on parole at the time of the instant offense. You
have presented yourself; 74 years old with medical issues and clean discipline.
Your COMPAS indicates no risk and case plan features satisfactory goals. The
panel is concerned given your account of the instant offense whereby admittedly
you drew your illegal weapon and shot the trooper strnggling over a jacket. You
laid on the back seat where you did not deny concealing yourself. You shot the
trooper and ran to seek cover and recognized that despite his returning fire your
looking under the vehicle revealing the trooper retreating by crossing the
Thruway. You expressed relief in that you expected something worse. Overall
your interview expressed shallow remorse whereby you did so once prodded. The
interview revealed what appeared to be your agitation with the process and its
repetition. A review of the sentencing minutes revealed the judge's premise that
your sentence would ·satisfy your debt to society. Moreover, the file features a
wealth of letters opposing your release at this time. Therefore, based on all the
factors in the file considered discretionary release is not appropriate.
Petitioner now moves this Court for an Order: (1) holding the New York State Board of
Parole in contempt of this Court for failure to comply with this Court's January 30, 2017
Decision and Order; (2) directing the New York State Board of Parole to afford Petitioner with a
de llQYQ hearing in full compliance with the Executive Law and the terms of this Court's January
30, 2017 Decision, Order and Judgment within 15 days; (3) directing the New York State Board
of Parole pay a daily fine of $500 directly to Petitioner every day until the contempt is purged;
and (4) directing Respondent to reimburse Petitioner's pro-bono attorneys for reasonable fees and
costs associated with this motion. Petitioner also moves this Court for an Order, directing the
New York State Board of Parole to disclose Petitioner's full and complete parole file considered
by Respondent in connection with his April 18, 2017 de novo hearing.
6
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Petitioner argues that Respondent failed to comply with this Court's Order by failing to
focus on his rehabilitative efforts and other statutory factors, rather than the events of over 42
years ago. Petitioner argues further that "Respondent again emphasized the 'wealth of letters
opposing'" Petitioner's release in spite of this Court's "remonstration that 'community
opposition' statements are not to be considered" (Memorandum of Law at 6). Finally, Petitioner
argues that "in an impennissibly conclusory opinion, Respondent again denied Petitioner rekase
to parole supervision based solely on the seriousness of the crime" "without pointing to any

aggravating factors that would" prevent his release (Memorandum of Law at 6).
"'A motion to punish a party for civil contempt is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, and the movant bears the burden of proving the contempt by clear and convincing
evidence."' El-Dehdan v. El-Dehdan, ·114 A.D.3d 4, 10 (2d Dept. 2013), aff'd 26 N.Y.3d 19
(2015), quoting Matter of Hughes v . Kamcncva, 96 A.D.3d 845 (2d Dept. 2012). Civil contempt
must be proved '"with reasonable certainty."' Matter of McCormick v. Ax elrod, 59 N.Y.2d 574,
583 (1983). "The 'reasonable certainty' standard requires 'a quantum of proof ... greater than a
preponderance of evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt ... akin to the clear and
convincing evidence standard."' P.l -Del1dan v_ E l-D ehdan, supra, quoting Kihl v . Pfe ffer, 47
A.D.3d 154, 163-64 (2d Dept. 2007). "[T]he proponent of a civil contempt motion must
establish the contemnor's failure to comply with a court order since it is the movant's burden to
establish that the court's mandate was clear and unequivocal." El- Dehd an v. El-Dehdan, supra,
citing Bennett v. Liberty Lines Tr .. Inc., 106 A.D.3d 1038, 1040 (2d Dept. 2013)(no disobedience
established where dispute over interpretation of order), and M ass imi v. Massimi, 56 A.D.3d 624,
625 (2d Dept. 2008)(burden not met because order not clear and unequivocal).
7
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In order to find that contempt has occurred in a given case, it must be detennined that a
lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect. It must
appear, with reasonable certainty, that the order has been disobeyed.

· 1-Dehdan v. EJ-Dehdan,

26 N_Y.Jd, supra at 29; see u.. Pereira v. Pere1ra, 35 N.Y.2d 301, 308 (1974); Matter of Specto r

v. Allen, 281N.Y.251, 259 (1939); K etchum v. Edw'1 r<ls, 153 N.Y. 534, 539 (1897); Coan v.
Coan, 86 A.D.2d 640, 641 (2d Dept.), film· dismi ssed 56 N.Y.2d 804 (1982). It must also be
established that the contenmor "had knowledge of the court's order," and there was prejudice to a
party's rights. El-Dehdan v. El-Dehdan, supra.
Here, the facts are simple. This Court ordered a de novo hearing to be done within 60

days, and that hearing was not done by that 60-day date - although Respondent requested an
adjournment, after the deadline, to which Petitioner consented. It was done 19 days later without
any explanation for the delay presented to the Court. Jn fact, Respondent does not even address
thjs lateness in its opposition.
Moreover, the Court disagrees with Respondent's position that it "fully complied with its
responsibilities" (Opposition at if I 6). The Court specifically ordered Respondent to focus on
Petitioner's rehabilitative efforts (Notice of Motion, Exh. I at 6). But, a review of the minutes
reveals that this was far from done. For 30 pages of the 35-page testimony, the two
Commissioners focused solely on the underlying crime and Petitioner's prior criminal history,
which pre-dated the instant offense. They accused him of being combative when he attempted to
correct the record after he noted that some of their statements were erroneous. To the Court, it
was clear that the Commissioners were unfamiliar with his case file other than the facts of his
crime, as weJI as the applicable statutes for which he was convicted. They asked Petitioner
8
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hypothetical questions related to the facts of his case, rather than focusing on the fact that he had
a clean prison record from 1990 and the fact that he repeatedly acknowledged his guilt and
expressed his remorse. Respondent conceded at oral argument that the hearing transcript does
not comply with the Court's January 301" Order. Despite asserting that the Commissioners
focused on all of the statutory factors, their words stated at the hearing and used in their written
decision reflect otherwise, as there was nothing more than a flee6ng reference to the other
statutory factors in the decision and there was a dearth of questions related to those factors at the
hearing. Instead, a fair reading of the transcript and decision simply reveal that the
Commissioners chose to rely almost solely on Petitioner's crucial past rather than all of the
criteria set forth in Executive Law §259-i (2)(c)(A), and all of the criteria set forth in 9 NYCRR
§§8002. l and 8002.2.

The Court is troubled by the contemptible conduct of Commissioners Ludlow and Cruse.
They chose to ignore the clear mandate contained in the Court's prior Order when they conducted
the hearing. If they cannot follow the law they have sworn to uphold, they should step down or
be removed. They perform no service by ignoring the Court's Order. The same is true for all

Commissioners who act similarly, and their Chairperson Tina M. Stanton, who tolerates such
behavior. Respondent's actions are an example of administrative

~mogance.

They do it because

they can. The virtually unbridled authority and discretion granted to the Parole Board in Hines v.
State Board of Parole, 293 NY 254 (1944) has not been closely examined. Instead, the Parole
Board, here, applies minimal lip service to the statutory criteria with the knowledge their actions
are subject to limited challenge. A minimal amount of required due process would protect a
fundamental liberty interest, but in the absence of meaningful judicial review, there is no

9
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incentive for such action by Respondent. It is time for Hines to be reexamined. The court takes
no position on the ultimate issue to be determined by the parole Board; instead, it only requires
that the task before the Board be performed properly; unlike the proceedings before
Commissioners Ludlow and Cruse.
The Court disagrees with Petitioner's position that this Court ordered Respondent not to
consider any community opposition at the de lli2YQ hearing. Rather, the Court ruled that it was
error for Respondent to contemplate community opposition from individuals and entities not
statutorily authorized to be considered. Since the motions were submitted, but prior to oral
argument, the Court received and reviewed the referenced community opposition letters in
camera. This "wealth of opposition" from third parties includes several out-of-stale letters, 46
letters with identical "boilerplate" opposition language, 8 letters expressing a desire to life
without parole and penal philosophy, and a few others. 4 And despite Respondent's position to

the contrary, these letters are not to remain confidential. Rather, only the names and addresses
are to remain confidential (see Executive Law §259-i[2][c][B]), not the substance of the letters.
While Respondent's counsel made assurances during oral argument that the

Commissioners used their discretion in determining which of these letters they properly relied
upon and which they disregarded for a lack of credibility, the Court is not convinced. The Court
was only presented with counsel's words to that effect - there is nothing before the Court, or in
the parole file, that conclusively establishes this was done. Rather, to the Court, this stack of
letters, which contains writings from individuals and entities other than those identified and

4

These letters are separate and apart from the moving and compelling victim impact
letters and statements, submitted by members of Trooper Dillon's family
10
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authorized in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)(v) and (vii), could have only had the desired of
effect of persuading the Commissioners in reaching their conclusion, especially since the sheer
number of them vastly out-numbered the statutoiily permissible ones. This is especially so since
many of the letters impermissibly expressed personal feelings of penal philosophy. See

Executive Law §259-i; Matter of K ing v. New Yo rk State D ivision of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788,
791 (1993); see also Ramirez v. Stanfo rd, Index No. 1928/2016 (Sup. Ct. [Dutchess) February 7,
2017) (Rosa, J.S.C.) (hearing annulled because "board improperly injected penal philosophy in

rendering the challenged detennination"). In short, Petitioner's right to a fair hearing was
prejudiced.
Accordingly, Petitioner's burden of proof has been met. The Court finds Respondent to
be in contempt. See Judiciary Law §753; Pl atten v. New York State Division o f Paro ! ~, 2010
WL 3843704 (Sup. Ct. September 28, 2010). The Court notes that Cassidv v . New Y rk. 'tate
Board of Parole (140 A.D.3d 953 [2d Dept. 2016)), does not stand for the proposition that the
Parole Board cannot be held in contempt, but rather that on the facts of that case, civil contempt
should have been denied. That is not the case here.
To the extent Petitioner is seeking attorney's fees, that application is granted. See
Judiciary Law §773;

~

genern lly Wei sman v. Weissman, 131 A.D.3d 529, 531 (2d Dept.

2015)(attorneys' fees properly awarded to husband for litigating ex-wife's civil contempt).
Petitioner may submit an affirmation and fee request, complete with an itemized breakdown of
time charges. See P latten v. New York State D ivision of Parole, supra. And finally, this Court is
without authority to direct Petitioner's immediate release. See Quartararo v. New York. Stale
Div. of Parole, 224 A.D.2d 26 (1'1 Dept. 1996).
11
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As such, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion to hold Respondent in contempt is granted to the extent stated
herein; and it is further
ORDERED that in light of the relief awarded herein, the motion for discovery is rendered
moot; and it is further
ORDERED that the determination is annulled and the matter is remitted to Respondent

for a de novo heari.n g on the matter of Petitioner's release to parole supervision within twenty
(20) days of the date of this Court's order, and a decision is to be issued within five (5) days of
the date of such hearing, but in no event later than November 17, 20 I 7. The conduct of this de
novo hearing shall be consistent with this Decision and Order and the Court's January 30, 2017
Decision and Order, and the mandates of Executive Law §§25 9-i. Such hearing shall be held

before a panel of the Board of Parole, no member of which shall have previously participated in
matters involving Petitioner, and shall focus on Petitioner' s rehabilitative efforts, rather than
solely on the events leading to his incarceration; and it is further
ORDERED that Respondent, and the Commissioners appointed to hear the application of
Petitioner, shall not utilize, review, or consider any submissions by third parties not specified in
Executive Law §259-i; and it is further

ORDERED that Respondent shall make available to Petitioner's counsel, the file and
materials to be utilized by the Commissioners, at least seventy-two hours before the hearing; and
it is further

ORDERED that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter; and it is further
ORDERED that Petitioner's attorneys may submit an application for attorney's fees; and
12
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it is further

ORDERED that nothing in this Decision and Order shall interfere with Petitioner's
entitlement to his next regularly-scheduled Parole Board appearance or any subsequentlyscheduled parole hearing.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
Dated: Poughkeepsie, New York
October 18, 2017

13
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